

## Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MOSCOW 10292

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT,UR

SUBJECT: THE SOVIET DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE BEFORE THE  
HELSINKI SUMMIT

1. COMMENT AND SUMMARY: DESPITE HIS FRAIL HEALTH, AS HE APPROACHES THE HELSINKI SUMMIT BREZHNEV STANDS IN A POSITION OF UNQUESTIONED POLITICAL DOMINANCE UNPARALLELED IN THE USSR SINCE THE DAYS OF STALIN. THE CURRENT ORGY OF SELF AND MUTUAL CONGRATULATIONS IN THE SOVIET PRESS AND MEDIA ON THE APOLLO-SOYUZ FLIGHT -- FOR WHICH BREZHNEV IS GETTING A MAJOR SHARE OF THE CREDIT -- IS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, SYMPTOMATIC OF THIS BREZHNEV ASCENDANCY. ALL INDICATORS SUGGEST THAT BREZHNEV IS IN BETTER HEALTH THAN WAS WIDELY THOUGHT AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS YEAR. THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS RETIREMENT HAS BEEN FREQUENTLY DISCUSSED IN THE WESTERN PRESS AND ELSEWHERE AND BREZHNEV HIMSELF IS AWARE OF THE THEORETICAL NEED TO RELINQUISH THE REINS AT SOME FUTURE POINT. BUT HE IS ALSO A SELF-DECLARED STRUGGLER FOR UNIVERSAL PEACE AND HE HAS PROCLAIMED HIS DETERMINATION TO DEVOTE ALL REMAINING STRENGTH TO ACHIEVING THIS AIM. SINCE WE CAN THINK OF NO BETTER VANTAGE POINT TO PURSUE THIS NOBLE QUEST THAN AS GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU, OUR BEST GUESS REMAINS THAT BREZHNEV WILL ELECT TO STAY IN OFFICE AS LONG AS HE IS

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PHYSICALLY ABLE TO SHOULDER HIS RESPONSIBILITIES.

2. THE ENORMOUS PROBLEM OF HOW TO CONTROL AND MOTIVATE A RECALCITRANT POPULATION STILL SMOLDERS ON AS DO BASIC ECONOMIC, AGRICULTURAL, AND NATIONALITY PROBLEMS. BUT THESE ARE THE SAME INTRACTABLE ISSUES THAT THE REGIME HAS BEEN TRYING TO COPE WITH SINCE 1917. IN THE LONG RUN, BECAUSE OF THESE PROBLEMS, THE SOVIET SYSTEM WILL EITHER FOLD OR IT WILL HAVE TO GO THROUGH GREAT CONVOLUTIONS TO DEAL WITH THEM. BUT AT THIS POINT THEY ARE ALL RELATIVELY UNDER CONTROL.

3. WHILE THE PROBLEMS OF DISSENT ARE FAR FROM SOLVED, DISSENTERS HAVE BECOME MORE DISORGANIZED AND LESS EFFECTIVE THANKS TO THE REMOVAL OF KEY FIGURES IN THE MOVEMENT THROUGH EMIGRATION -- VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY -- AND BECAUSE OF UNDRAMATIC BUT INEXORABLE KGB PRESSURES. THE GREAT VOICES HAVE GONE ELSEWHERE OR ARE SILENCED. WESTERN INTEREST IN THE PLIGHT OF THESE PEOPLE, LIKE THAT OF A FICKLE LOVER, HAS WANED. JEWISH EMIGRATION HAS FALLEN SHARPLY IN RESPONSE TO MANY FACTORS, BUT PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF HARASSMENT OF APPLICANTS FOR DEPARTURE.

4. IN THE MEANWHILE, THE UNEXPECTED FOREIGN CURRENCY BONANZA WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE GARNERED AS A RESULT OF THEIR SURPLUSES IN OIL AND GOLD, AND THE SOLID PERFORMANCE OF THEIR ECONOMY IN COMPARISON WITH THE RECESSION-PLAGUED WEST HAS PLACED THE LEADERSHIP IN A COMPARATIVELY STRONG DOMESTIC ECONOMIC SITUATION. BUT THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BE ABLE TO SOLVE THEIR PERENNIAL AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS OR THAT ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS PROPOSED BY BREZHNEV IN THIS SPHERE WILL BE EFFECTIVE. ANOTHER MODEST AGRICULTURAL YEAR HAS TRIGGERED FURTHER SOVIET GRAIN BUYING IN THE WEST. THIS CONTINUING DEPENDENCE ON THE U.S., CANADA AND AUSTRALIA FOR BASIC NOURISHMENT BODES WELL FOR A CONTINUATION OF DETENTE. THE DOMESTIC IMPERATIVE TO IMPROVE LIVING STANDARDS NECESSARILY REMAINS A MAJOR LEADERSHIP GOAL. THIS, AS WELL AS MORE IMMEDIATE FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS -- CSCE, SECRET

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EXCHANGE OF VISITS BETWEEN ASTRONAUTS AND COSMONAUTS, THE U.S. SUMMIT, ALL LEADING UP TO A REAFFIRMATION OF DETENTE AT THE 25TH CPSU CONGRESS -- SHOULD ENSURE POSITIVE PUBLIC TREATMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY THE KREMLIN OVER THE NEXT HALF YEAR.

5. THE CULTURAL SCENE REMAINS BLEAK, PARTLY AS A

RESULT OF THE FACT THAT CULTURAL POLICY IS EVIDENTLY STILL BEING HOTLY DEBATED WITHIN PARTY RANKS. IN ANY CASE, CREATIVE INTELLECTUALS SEE LITTLE CHANCE OF EASED CONTROLS DURING THE LIFE OF THE PHILISTINE BREZHNEV REGIME. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

6. BREZHNEV'S POLITICAL STANDING. THE MEETING AT HELSINKI IN AND OF ITSELF IS AMPLE TESTIMONY TO THE SUCCESS OF BREZHNEV'S POST-CZECHOSLOVAK POLICY OF SEEKING AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE U.S. AND ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES. BREZHNEV GETS THE CREDIT FOR THIS IN THE OFFICIAL SOVIET MEDIA, AND PERSONAL TRIBUTES TO HIM CLEARLY OUTSHINE THE CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, WHICH STILL RECEIVES LIP SERVICE. ON THE OTHER HAND, COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP IS A REAL FACT OF LIFE IN THE USSR BECAUSE OF BREZHNEV'S STYLE OF CONSENSUS POLITICS AND THE GENUINE POLITICAL WEIGHT OF PODGORNYY, KOSYGIN AND SUSLOV. THE CONSIGNMENT TO OBLIVION LAST APRIL OF ALEXANDER SHELEPIN, THE TRADE UNION LEADER AND FORMER KGB CHIEF WHO WAS ONCE A SERIOUS RIVAL TO BREZHNEV, WAS A CLEAR INDICATOR OF BREZHNEV'S CURRENT FORMIDABLE POLITICAL STRENGTH. NEVERTHELESS, BREZHNEV LAST WINTER WENT THROUGH A MAJOR RESPIRATORY ILLNESS, SUFFERS FROM A LONG LIST OF MEDICAL COMPLAINTS INCLUDING SERIOUS DENTAL PROBLEMS, AND IS EVIDENTLY STILL NOT WORKING THE HORATIO ALGER HOURS WHICH WOULD NORMALLY BE EXPECTED OF ANY POLITBURO MEMBER. WE FEEL THAT PERHAPS THE KEY TO HIS CONTINUATION IN OFFICE IS THE FACT THAT THE OTHER MAJOR POLITBURO MEMBERS WITH CONSTITUENCIES OF THEIR OWN -- PODGORNYY, KOSYGIN, SUSLOV, KIRILENO -- ARE ALL OLDER THAN HE AND WOULD ALL, IN LINE WITH SOVIET TRADITIONS, LIKE TO REMAIN  
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IN HARNESS AS LONG AS THEY POSSIBLY CAN. (DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER V.V. KUZNETSOV, FOR EXAMPLE, IS 74. MANY OTHER SIMILAR INSTANCES COULD BE CITED.) SINCE HAVING A YOUNGER MAN ASSUME BREZHNEV'S MANTLE WOULD BE AN IMPETUS TO EARLIER RETIREMENT FOR THESE VENERABLE FIGURES, IT IS IN THEIR INTEREST TO PROP BREZHNEV UP AS LONG AS HE CAN PERFORM ADEQUATELY. OUR BEST GUESS THEREFORE REMAINS THAT HE WILL ATTEMPT TO FOLLOW THE GERIATRIC EXAMPLES SET BY OTHER COMMUNIST BRETHREN OF SORTS, SUCH AS MAO AND TITO, AND REMAIN ON THE WORLD STAGE FOR AS MANY YEARS TO COME AS HIS HEALTH WILL PERMIT.

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7. SOCIAL TRENDS. THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROGRAM ESPOUSED BY BREZHNEV HAS ACHIEVED A MODERATE DEGREE OF SUCCESS, PARTICULARLY WHEN ALLOWANCES ARE MADE FOR THE PECULIAR FEATURES OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND ECONOMY. THE LEADERSHIP HAS PROPOSED BROAD POLICIES AIMED AT GRADUAL, BUT STEADY, INCREASES IN THE STANDARD OF LIVING ACCOMPANIED BY PARALLEL GROWTH IN THE ARMED STRENGTH AND POWER OF THE USSR. THIS HAS BEEN COUNTERPOINTED BY CONTINUED TIGHT CONTROLS ON CULTURE AND INFORMATION AS WELL AS PROPHYLACTIC MEASURES TO AVOID INFECTION FROM FOREIGN TRENDS AND IDEAS. AS THE THREAT FROM THE WEST RECEDES IN THE POPULAR MIND, AND AS PUBLIC INTEREST IN MARXISM-LENINISM AND POLITICAL DOCTRINE HAS FADED, PRIMARY PROPAGANDA EMPHASIS IS NOW PUT ON CONSUMERISM (I.E., SELF-ENRICHMENT) AND A BLEND OF NATIONALISTIC PATRIOTISM WITH HEAVY MILITARISTIC OVERTONES. BY AND LARGE, WE FEEL THAT THESE REGIME POLICIES HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE, ESPECIALLY AMONG THE ETHNIC RUSSIAN - HALF OF THE POPULATION OF THE SOVIET UNION. (THE FACT THAT THERE ARE FAR MORE NON-RUSSIAN THAN RUSSIAN BABIES BEING BORN TODAY IS A DEMOGRAPHIC TREND WHICH WILL OBVIOUSLY HAVE A PROFOUND EFFECT IN THE FUTURE.) SOLZHENITSYN IS, OF COURSE, CORRECT IN STATING THAT MARXIST-LENINIST INDOCTRINATION IS REGARDED AS SOMETHING OF A JOKE BY THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE SOVIET POPULATION. AS A RESULT, THE WIDESPREAD CYNICISM WHICH EXISTS HERE WITH REGARD

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TO OFFICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS AND PUBLIC POLICIES IS PROBABLY UNEQUALLED ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD. BUT AS TYRANTS HAVE DISCOVERED FROM THE DAWN OF HISTORY, THE EASIEST GROUP OF ALL TO CONTROL ARE THE CYNICS. IT IS THE PASSIONATE BELIEVERS WHO POSE THE PROBLEMS FOR THE KREMLIN.

8. TIGHTER CONTROLS ON DISSENTERS. THROUGH TRIAL AND ERROR FINE-TUNING, THE KGB HAS LEARNED TO CONTROL POLITICAL DISSENTERS WITHOUT REAPING AS MANY NEGATIVE HEADLINES IN THE WORLD PRESS AS WAS FORMALLY THE CASE. EMIGRATION HAS BEEN USED BY THE REGIME TO RID ITSELF OF NOISY AND EFFECTIVE DISSIDENTS, JEWS AND NON-JEWS ALIKE. SOME "ANTI-SOCIAL ELEMENTS" HAVE BEEN CLAPPED INTO PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES AND TREATED IN A MANNER ARTFULLY CALCULATED TO "REMOVE THEM PERMANENTLY" FROM THE NUMBER OF ACTIVE DISSENTERS. HARASSMENT AND THE THREAT OF REPRISALS AGAINST HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN USED TO SUPPRESS TEMPORARILY PUBLICATIONS SUCH AS THE CHRONICLE OF CURRENT EVENTS, WHICH REAPPEARS ONLY SPORADICALLY. AN EXTENSIVE EFFORT BY THE SECRET POLICE IS NOW UNDERWAY AGAINST PUBLICATIONS ISSUED BY LITHUANIAN CATHOLICS. OTHER DISSIDENT LITERATURE STILL APPEARS, BUT IN A LESS ORGANIZED FASHION AND OF FAR LESS INTRINSIC HISTORIC OR LITERARY INTEREST THAN WAS THE CASE DURING THE GOLDEN ERA OF SAMIZDAT, WHICH EXISTED ONLY A FEW YEARS AGO. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN AIDED IN THIS CAMPAIGN BY MAJOR EVENTS IN THE OUTSIDE WORLD WHICH HAVE LESSENED FOREIGN INTEREST IN THE PLIGHT OF SOVIET DISSENTERS AND JEWS. LOCAL DISSIDENTS HAVE LEARNED THAT PHONECALLS TO WESTERN CORRESPONDENTS NO LONGER LEAD TO AUTOMATIC FIRST-PAGE TREATMENT IN AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET TACTIC OF ISOLATING AND STIFLING THE DISSENTERS RATHER THAN AMELIORATING THE PROBLEMS WHICH GIVE RISE TO DISSENT GUARANTEES THAT THIS PROBLEM TO A GREATER OR LESSER DEGREE WILL CONTINUE IN THE SOVIET UNION DESPITE THE CURRENT SUCCESS OF THE KGB IN DEALING WITH IT.

9. JEWISH EMIGRATION. THE VERY FACT OF JEWISH  
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EMIGRATION ITSELF HAS HAD, AND CONTINUES TO HAVE, PROFOUND INTERNAL EFFECTS ON SOVIET SOCIETY. IN ORDER TO CUT DOWN ON THE FLOW OF JEWISH EMIGRANTS, THE POLICE ARE PURSUING A POLICY OF LARGE-SCALE,

BUT UNPUBLICIZED, MINOR-KEY INDIVIDUAL HARASSMENT OF THOSE WHO PETITION FOR EMIGRATION. THIS PERSECUTION IS RANDOM IN NATURE. SOME RECEIVE PERMISSION, WHILE OTHERS, FOR NO APPARENT REASON, DO NOT. THIS KEEPS WOULD-BE EMIGRES OFF BALANCE AND IS AN EFFECTIVE TOOL OF THE AUTHORITIES IN ENSURING THAT THEY WILL NOT HAVE TO GO TO TOO MUCH TROUBLE TO REMAIN ON TOP OF THIS PROBLEM. HOPE IS ALWAYS HELD OUT, EVEN FOR THE "REFUSENIKS," WHO KNOW THAT THE AUTHORITIES HAVE CHANGED THEIR MINDS IN THE PAST ABOUT THOSE WHO HAVE NOT CAUSED TOO MUCH OF A PROBLEM. THE MESSAGE IS CLEAR -- DON'T ROCK THE BOAT AND SOONER OR LATER YOU WILL GET YOUR EXIT PERMIT. IN ADDITION, THE MEDIA POLICY OF PUBLICIZING THE DIFFICULTIES FOR SOVIET JEWS OF LIFE IN ISRAEL HAS UNDOUBTEDLY PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT PART IN DAMPENING SOMEWHAT THE INTEREST IN EMIGRATION. ECONOMIC PRESSURES IN THE WEST AND DIFFICULTIES ALREADY EXPERIENCED BY SOVIET EMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES ARE, OF COURSE, ALSO AMPLY PUBLICIZED HERE. THE NET RESULT OF ALL THESE FACTORS HAS BEEN A SHARPLY DIMINISHED FLOW OF SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRANTS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE INTERNAL SITUATION FOR SOVIET JEWS IS POOR AND THE PROSPECTS FOR THEIR CHILDREN ARE EVEN WORSE. MANY COMPLAIN THAT THEY GET IT IN THE NECK BOTH WAYS; THEY ARE NOT ALLOWED TO ASSIMILATE AND AT THE SAME TIME THEY ARE NOT GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THEIR JEWISHNESS. THE FACT THAT SO MANY HAVE EMIGRATED ABROAD RAISES A CLOUD OF SUSPICION ABOVE THOSE WHO REMAIN. IT IS NOW FAR MORE DIFFICULT TO BE ACCEPTED BY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS OR TO GET A GOOD JOB IF ONE IS JEWISH. THUS, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE JEWISH QUESTION WILL REMAIN A MAJOR IRRITANT FOR THE REGIME, AS WELL AS A PROBLEM IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, AT LEAST UNTIL THE SOVIETS DECLARE AN OPEN SEASON ON JEWISH EMIGRATION.

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EXDIS

10. BREZHNEV'S ECONOMIC PLANS. AMONG SPECIFIC DOMESTIC PROGRAMS WHICH HAVE BEEN ADVANCED BY BREZHNEV ARE THE REJUVENATION OF THE RURAL AREAS ON THE TRADITIONAL RUSSIAN HEARLAND TO THE NORTH OF THE BLACK EARTH ZONE AND THE OPENING FOR DEVELOPMENT OF VAST AREAS OF SIBERIA AND THE FAR EAST BY THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE BAM RAILWAY PARALLEL TO AND NORTH OF THE EXISTING TRANS-SIBERIAN LINE. THE PERENNIAL PROBLEM OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT AND MISMANAGEMENT IS AGAIN UNDER ATTACK. THE POST-KHRUSCHEV PROGRAM OF RE-CENTRALIZATION OF ECONOMIC MINISTRIES IS NOW IN THE PHASE OF DEVELOPMENT OF VERTICAL ECONOMIC TRUSTS CALLED ASSOCIATIONS. BREZHNEV'S PROGRAM FOR REFORMING AGRICULTURAL ADMINISTRATION HAS APPARENTLY GOTTEN STUCK IN A SWAMP OF BUREAUCRATIC OPPOSITION AND IS MAKING NO FORWARD PROGRESS. AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT PROGRAMS ARE PROCEEDING AND LOCAL PROGRAMS AIMED AT INDUSTRIALIZING FARM PRODUCTION ARE UNDERWAY. BUT THE PROBLEM OF INCENTIVES FOR THE PEASANTRY, WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO SOLVE DURING THE PAST 57 YEARS, IS NOT BEING ATTACKED REALISTICALLY AND THE PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET AGRICULTURE MEETING THE AMBITIOUS PLANS BEING SET FOR IT ARE ALMOST, NIL. THE PROJECTED DRAFTING OF A NEW FIVE YEAR-PLAN, THE TENTH, FOR ADOPTION AT THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS IN FEBRUARY, WILL CONTINUE TO OCCUPY  
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MUCH OF THE ECONOMIC MANAGERS' EFFORT THIS FALL. PROSPECTS FOR FORMULATION OF A SIGNIFICANT FIFTEEN-YEAR PLAN ENDING IN 1990 SEEM LESS PROMISING, AND THE IDEA HAS BEEN AVOIDED BY OFFICIAL SPEAKERS LATELY. IN FACT, A PASSING REFERENCE TO THE FIFTEEN-YEAR PLAN IN A SPEECH BY POLITBURO MEMBER KUNAYEV WAS DELETED FROM THE PRAVDA VERSION OF HIS TEXT. THE UNUSUAL FAILURE TO ANNOUNCE THE AGENDA AND SPEAKERS FOR THE NEXT PARTY CONGRESS WELL IN ADVANCE MAY BE CONNECTED WITH DIFFICULTIES IN DRAFTING THIS REPORT AND ALMOST CERTAINLY REFLECT DOMESTIC RATHER THAN FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS.

11. PARTY ELECTIONS. THE SCHEDULE CALLS FOR A ROUND

OF ELECTIONS BEGINNING AT THE BOTTOM LEVELS THIS FALL AND ENDING WITH THE PARTY CONGRESS IN FEBRUARY. THE ELECTION OF NEW PARTY LEADERS AT ALL LEVELS WILL BE REFLECTED IN THE NEW CENTRAL COMMITTEE WHICH WILL, OF COURSE, HAVE MAJOR INFLUENCE ON FUTURE NATIONAL POLICY. THE VARIOUS PARTY CHANGES MADE TO DATE, ALTHOUGH STILL NOT LARGE ENOUGH TO ESTABLISH SIGNIFICANT TRENDS, SUPPORT THE TRADITIONAL WISDOM THAT THE LEADING FUTURE CONTENDERS FOR THE POSTS NOW HELD BY BREZHNEV AND KOSYGIN ARE KIRILENKO AND MAZUROV RESPECTIVELY. IF IT WERE DECIDED THAT A YOUNGER MAN IS NEEDED FOR FIRST SECRETARY, OUR MONEY WOULD BE ON KULAKOV, DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE HAS ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY BEEN IN THE AGRICULTURAL FIELD.

12. THE CULTURAL SCENE SHOWS FEW SIGNS OF LIFE. OTHER THAN IN THE PERFORMANCE OF MUSIC, THERE IS LITTLE OF REAL MERIT EITHER BEING PRODUCED OR PUBLISHED HERE. LOCAL DISSIDENT PAINTERS HAVE ARRANGED SOME EXHIBITIONS WHICH DO NOT MEET THE OFFICIAL CANON OF ACCEPTABILITY. HOWEVER, THE ARTISTIC MERIT OF SUCH EXHIBITIONS ARE QUESTIONABLE AND THEY REMAIN MORE POLITICAL THAN GENUINE ARTISTIC EVENTS. IN ANY CASE, AFTER A SERIES OF CAT AND MOUSE CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE SOVIET CULTURAL ESTABLISHMENT, THE PAINTERS HAVE DECIDED TO BACK OFF, WAITING FOR A MORE PROPITIOUS MOMENT WHICH MAY NEVER COME. NO NEW POETS OF REAL MERIT ARE ON THE HORIZON. THE

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GREATEST OF THEM, IOSIF BRODSKY, WAS ALLOWED TO EMIGRATE. ANDREY VOZNESENSKIY CONTINUES TO CREATE FIRST-RATE WORK, AND YEVGENIY YEVTUSHENKO PRODUCES SOME GOOD VERSE AMIDST TOPICAL DOGGEREL. MANY OF THE BEST SOVIET NOVELISTS, EVEN ASIDE FROM SOLZHENITSYN, HAVE EMIGRATED. SHOLOKHOV IS NOW REGARDED NOT ONLY AS AN OLD FOOL, BUT A FRAUD AS WELL. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN SOME EXCEPTIONS, SOVIET FILMS ARE GENERALLY OF DISMAL QUALITY. THOSE THAT HAVE REAL WORTH ARE SHOWN ONLY BRIEFLY AND TO SELECT AUDIENCES WITHIN THE USSR, BUT HAVE ACHIEVED MODERATE SUCCESS ABROAD AS WELL AS PRESTIGE AND HARD CURRENCY EARNINGS. THE MOOD AMONG THE REALLY CREATIVE ELEMENT IN THIS SOCIETY IS BLEAK. THEY SEE LITTLE CHANCE OF A SWING OF THE PENDULUM BACK TOWARD THE EASIER CONTROLS AND THE ENORMOUS CREATIVE EXCITEMENT WHICH EXISTED DURING THE EARLY '60S. THEY WRYLY SUPPORT DETENTE; BUT IT IS A DETENTE OF THE PHILISTINES, THEY SAY.



13. IN SUM, BREZHNEV AND HIS COLLEAGUES ARE NOT  
YET BLESSED WITH DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY; FAR FROM IT.  
BASIC PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE SYSTEM CONTINUE TO  
SMOLDER AND DISSENT IS NOT YET UNDER CONTROL.  
NEVERTHELESS, THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC  
SYSTEMS CONTINUE TO FUNCTION UP TO EXPECTATIONS  
AND IT IS HARD TO THINK OF A PERIOD ON SOVIET  
HISTORY WHEN THE LEADERSHIP OF THE USSR HAS BEEN  
IN SO FORTUNATE OR COMMANDING A POSITION, EITHER  
INTERNALLY OR INTERNATIONALLY.  
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